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On the Complexity of
On the Complexity of “Ideas in America”: The Origins
and Achievements of the Classical Age of Pragmatism[1]

more than a dozen other major pre- and -post Civil War
thinkers. The book artfully synthesizes personal biography, family history, local culture, and individual psyFew historians disagree that the events surrounding chology with broad currents of popular culture, generathe Civil War marked a decisive break in American na- tional tensions, international scientific and philosophic
tional development, and few would deny that a key com- discourse, and the massive political and social transponent of that break was the elaboration and spread of formations that came with industrialism, America’s exnew ideas and attitudes about matters of fundamental
panding role in world affairs, and the onset of an ever
importance: nature, science, religion, politics, psycholmore relentless modernism. The result is a compelling
ogy, philosophy, and social organization. In The Meta- narrative, as captivating in its telling as it is illuminatphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America, Louis Menand, ing in its content. Without sacrificing depth or detail,
who teaches at the Graduate School of the City Univer- and without compromising his analysis’s complexity or
sity of New York, reexamines the roots of those intellec- subtlety, Menand gives us a lucid, insightful, and abtual changes, their evolution through the late nineteenth
sorbing reexamination of the intellectual origins of our
and early twentieth centuries, and their long-term sigmodernist/post-modernist world.
nificance in American life and thought. “The Civil War
swept away the slave civilization of the South, but it
Menand divides his book into five parts. Each of
swept away almost the whole intellectual culture of the the first four focuses on one of his four major figures,
North along with it,” he maintains. “It took nearly half a exploring his life and intellectual development into the
century for the United States to develop a culture to re- first years of the twentieth century. The fifth part examplace it, to find a set of ideas, and a way of thinking that ines subsequent elaborations of the ideas that they adwould help people cope with the conditions of modern vanced and seeks to understand their impact on Amerilife.” The long, complex “struggle” to find such an ac- can thought through the rest of the century.
ceptable new intellectual framework is the subject of his
The book’s deeper structure falls into three distinct
book (p. x).
sections. The first (the three parts dealing with Holmes,
The Metaphysical Club concentrates on four tower- James, and Peirce) is a sensitive, brilliant exploration of
ing, familiar figures -Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (b.1841), the complex social - especially the local cultural and inWilliam James (b. 1842), Charles Sanders Peirce (b. terpersonal - origins of the underlying concerns, ideas,
1839), and John Dewey (b.1859) - along the way inte- ambitions, and strategies that evolved into American
grating briefer accounts of the lives and contributions of pragmatism. Menand recreates the intellectual and cul-
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tural world of pre- and post-Civil War Boston and Cambridge, exploring the interrelated lives of an influential
but nevertheless peripheral intellectual elite in a time of
deep sectional conflict and moral crisis. Holmes, the ardent young abolitionist sympathizer and thrice-wounded
Union officer, learns from the horrors of war to distrust
and scorn moral absolutes and “certainties” of all types.
James, the indecisive would-be scientist who refused to
join the Union army and thereby missed “the defining
experience of his generation” (p. 74), learns to satisfy
his own emotional needs by exploiting the openness, uncertainty, and contingency that he finds in newly dominant evolutionary theory. Peirce, an intellectual prodigy
whose life was scarred by a painful neurological disorder that led him to drug addiction and a career marked
by erratic and self-destructive actions, learns from statistical theory that randomness does not necessarily mean
disorder and that human knowledge was not a “mirror”
of nature but the product of “social” consensus.

Peirce, Dewey was the progeny of significantly different
intellectual and cultural traditions. Born in small-town
Vermont, the son of a Unionist storekeeper and a socially
active but orthodox Congregationalist mother, he was
far removed from the prestigious, interconnected intellectual circles of Boston and Cambridge (p. 250). Again
unlike the others, he was a product of the emerging modern American university system - secular, scientifically
based, nationally oriented, and professionally directed that had helped destroy the local, private “Metaphysical Club.” Dewey “reached maturity as a thinker at exactly the moment American social and economic life was
tipping over into modern forms of organization, forms
whose characteristics reflect the effects of size: impersonal authority, bureaucratic procedure, mass markets”
(p. 236). Those differences proved crucial. “Unlike almost every other serious thinker of his time,” Menand
declares, Dewey “was at home in modernity” (p. 237).
Also unlike Menand’s other three thinkers, and most
important for the future of pragmatism, Dewey turned
to politics and social activism, in large part because his
professional academic career took him to the University
of Chicago in 1894, the year of the Pullman Strike. There
he met, among others, Jane Addams, the founder of Hull
House, who exerted a compelling influence on the new
chairman of the university’s philosophy department. Addams not only pulled Dewey into the world of political and social reform, but convinced him that “the resistance the world puts up to our actions and desires is not
the same as a genuine opposition of interests” (p. 313).
In other words, she persuaded Dewey of the fundamental compatibility of human desires and interests when
properly understood; for the next half-century, Dewey
used the tools of pragmatism to show how and why that
principle could illuminate and resolve political and social
problems of all kinds. Thus, Menand uses Dewey’s career
to explore the vital confrontation that occurred in the late
nineteenth century between the philosophical ideas that
were crystallizing into pragmatism and the multiplying
challenges that came to America with industrialization
and modernization.

At the end of this first section, we find Menand’s
chapter on the “Metaphysical Club,” the legendary, shortlived discussion group in Cambridge, Massachusetts in
the early 1870s that brought together many of the “founding fathers” of American pragmatism - not only Holmes,
James, and Peirce but also such key, albeit less wellknown, figures as Chauncey Wright and Nicholas St.
John Green.

It was in the context of that group that Peirce explored the implications of the randomness of the universe and the contingency of human reasoning and
that he reached his conclusion about the “social” nature
of human knowledge, one of pragmatism’s foundation
ideas and his “most important contribution to American
thought” (p. 200). The chapter, and this long substantive
first section, concludes with the end of “The Metaphysical
Club” itself, which began to “pull apart” in the summer of
1872 and collapsed with the premature deaths of Wright
(d. 1875) and Green (d. 1876). The club’s demise, Menand
suggests, was symbolic: though traceable to a plethora of
personal and individual factors, it was also the result of
an institutionalizing, professionalizing, and modernizing
The book’s third substantive section (its fifth part
society. “In the end, the Metaphysical Club unraveled
and a brief “Epilogue”) carries pragmatism’s history from
because Harvard University was reformed” (p. 230).
around 1904 to the end of the twentieth century. It reThe book’s second substantive section, the last and
counts the brief remaining careers of James (d. 1910) and
longest of the first four parts, begins with a discussion
Peirce (d. 1914) as well as the longer, more publicly visof Dewey’s early education in Burlington, Vermont, but ible careers of Holmes (d. 1935) and Dewey (d. 1964).
it soon broadens - like Dewey’s career and philosophy - Further, it introduces and evaluates some of the quarfrom the local and personal to the national and public. tet’s principal successors. Finally, it seeks to identify the
Almost twenty years younger than Holmes, James, and ways that the ideas of Holmes, James, Peirce, and Dewey
2
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helped to shape American thought through the rapidly
changing world of the later twentieth century. Menand
explores the variations that marked the distinct “pragmatisms” they developed, focusing on their contributions
to democratic theory, to emerging ideas of political and
cultural pluralism, and to expanding ideas of human freedom, especially those involving free speech and academic
freedom. “The political system their philosophy was designed to support was democracy,” he explains, and perhaps their greatest achievement was to help “make tolerance an official virtue in modern America” (p. 440, and
see also p. 439).

depends not on their immutability but on their adaptability.”

Although it discusses a few important developments
in the 1920s and 1930s (such as the Supreme Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence and early battles over
academic freedom), it skims over the century’s final six
decades, ignoring in the process major phases in the continuing history of pragmatism in American thought.

The book’s major achievement is its subtle, complex,
modulated explanation of pragmatism’s human origins:
pragmatism “was the product of a group of individuals, and it took its shape from the way they bounced
off one another, their circumstances, and the mysteries of their unreproducible personalities” (p. 371). In
other words, the book does not limit itself to examining changes in philosophical schools, concepts, and arguments, nor rest content with discussions of pragmatism’s
intellectual roots and fostering social context.

Menand’s statement captures many key assumptions
behind pragmatism: that ideas are instrumental, socially
created, environmentally dependent, and both changing
and changeable.

Menand tells us that his book “is an effort to write
about these ideas in their own spirit - that is, to try to
see ideas as always soaked through by the personal and
social situations in which we find them” (p. xii). His similes reinforce his methodology. Ideas are neither sacred
Unlike the book’s earlier sections, Part V’s strength nor transcendent but rather ordinary, entirely real-world
phenomena, like “forks” and “germs.” As attentive as the
is its thematic unity - not its depth, detail, or insight into
book is to ideas and their interconnections, it ultimately
individual thinkers. Indeed, it is necessarily thinner in its
analysis and even somewhat arbitrary in its selection of insists that their origin, evolution, and fate was deterissues and individuals. It is also unbalanced chronologi- mined by the way they did or did not “fit” with social
needs and conditions (see, e.g., p. 369).
cally.

II.
Menand announces in his “Preface” that Holmes,
James, Peirce, and Dewey “were more responsible than
any other group for moving American thought into the
modern world” (p. xi). “Their challenge, as they perceived it, was to devise a theory of conduct that made
sense in a universe of uncertainty” (p. 214). Acknowledging, indeed highlighting, differences among them, he
nonetheless isolates what he considers the intellectual
core they shared, “their attitude toward ideas.” What they
“had in common was not a group of ideas, but a single
idea - an idea about ideas.” He expands on this point (pp.
xi-xii):

Nor does it suggest that personal elements - even
such powerful factors as Holmes’s devastating experiences in the Civil War and James’s debilitating religious
and psychological crises - were, by themselves, decisive.
Rather, it attempts to integrate all those considerations,
and many others as well, into a comprehensive, finelygrained analysis of the lived experiences of an extraordinary group of individuals and to show when, why, and
how their varied needs, concerns, anxieties, and ambitions combined in the specific historical context of postCivil War America to move their thoughts and feelings
in certain new directions.

“They all believed that ideas are not ”out there“ waiting to be discovered, but are tools - like forks and knives
and microchips - that people devise to cope with the
world in which they find themselves. They believed that
ideas are produced not by individuals, but by groups of
individuals - that ideas are social. They believed that
ideas do not develop according to some inner logic of
their own, but are entirely dependent, like germs, on
their human carriers and the environment. And they believed that since ideas are provisional responses to particular and unreproducible circumstances, their survival

Menand’s discussion of his major figures’ personal
and family backgrounds is subtle and illuminating. Eschewing summaries, he considers the lives, aspirations,
and beliefs of friends, colleagues, and family members,
suggesting the variety of influences they exerted. Not
surprisingly, he focuses on the respective roles played
by three unusually distinguished and accomplished fathers: the physician, scientist, and essayist Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.; the eccentric, anti-establishment reli3
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gious seeker and writer Henry James the elder; and the
internationally-recognized mathematician and Harvard
professor Benjamin Peirce. Menand is equally sensitive
to the divisions that developed between generations, and
he marks the extent to which historical change, generational conflict, and idiosyncratic personal characteristics
cut off the fathers from their sons. Although Peirce remained loyal to his father’s values and attitudes, James
and Holmes drifted ever farther from those of their fathers. “The usual biographical practice has been to assume continuity,” Menand writes of the relationship between the Jameses, “but the social history suggests rupture” (p. 84). Tracing a growing split between Holmes
and his father, Menand generalizes: “Holmes’s rejection
of the intellectual style of pre-war Boston mirrored a
generational shift. To many of the men who had been
through the war, the values of professionalism and expertise were attractive; they implied impersonality, respect
for institutions as efficient organizers of enterprise, and a
modern and scientific attitude - the opposites of the individualism, humanitarianism, and moralism that characterized Northern intellectual life before the war” (p. 59).

on “The Law of Errors,” tracing the development of statistical theory in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century, provides a particularly enlightening account of
a series of scientific advances that informed the thinking of the early pragmatists. Probability theory attracted
them because it seemed capable of reconciling two fundamental, conflicting ideas, that life was marked by randomness and contingency and that a knowable order existed in nature. “The broader appeal of statistics lay in the
idea of an order beneath apparent randomness” (p. 194).
Statistics, moreover, exerted a particularly powerful appeal for James and Peirce, Menand suggests, because it
offered a natural order that was scientifically knowable
but still only “probabilistic” and not “deterministic.”

Perhaps most unusual, The Metaphysical Club stresses
the impact of slavery and racism on American life and
thought. Although few would question the general importance of either factor, histories of the more elevated
types of thought often minimize or ignore their significance. Menand, however, highlights their constant presence and implies their pervasive importance. Scientific
inquiry in the United States before and after Darwin,
Exploring the complex ways that ideas interact and he shows, was driven in significant part by racist asevolve, Menand highlights a wide range of connections. sumptions, shaping, for example, the work of such a
In a few scattered pages, for example, he suggests Emer- distinguished practitioner as Agassiz, the dean of midson’s role in the pre-war period and marks his continued, nineteenth-century American science and the teacher of
if diluted, significance in the post-war era. “Holmes’s both James and Peirce. Similarly, Holmes’s father and
posture of intellectual isolation was, after all, essentially grandfather, the Jameses, and the Peirces all accepted
Emersonian,” he points out (p. 68), noting further that racist assumptions in one form or another, as did many
pragmatism “shares Emerson’s distrust of institutions of the epigones who enter the story as it reaches the
and systems, and his manner of appropriating ideas while late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, includdiscarding their philosophical foundations” (p. 370, and ing the labor leader Eugene V. Debs (whose American
see also p. 89). More broadly, Menand joins those schol- Railway Union did not admit blacks) and Dewey’s culars who emphasize the continuing, widespread influence tural acolyte, Horace M. Kallen (whose idea of a national
of religion in nineteenth-century America. Protestant “melting pot” was based on the premise that individual
Christianity in its varying forms was an essential element character was determined by an “immutable” race factor).
in the upbringing of all of his characters, even the few - Indeed, Menand explores the “pluralist” implications of
such as the Holmeses - who seemed immune from its spe- pragmatism by focusing on the way that later thinkers,
cific claims. It was an unavoidable force field that helped especially Kallen and Alain Locke (a black writer best
shape their characters and beliefs even as they tried to known for his work on the Harlem Renaissance), used
reconceive its foundations or reject its authority. Indeed, Dewey’s work to try to deal with problems of racial and
Menand explains, “the splintering of American Protes- ethnic division in American society. “Only in Dewey’s
tantism into multiple religious and quasi-religious sects conception does the specter of race completely disapover the course of the [nineteenth] century - the Protes- pear,” Menand maintains, because “he insisted that ditantization, so to speak of Protestantism - is part of the visions are just temporary alignments within a common
larger, more inchoate context out of which pragmatism whole” (p. 407).
emerged” (p. 89).
III.
Menand is especially informative in his discussion of
For legal and constitutional historians The Metaphysithe scientific context in which his figures, particularly
cal
Club
offers a rich, thoughtful discussion of intellectual
James and Peirce, matured. Most striking, his chapter
4
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developments crucial to the evolution of American law
and jurisprudence. More specifically, it illuminates three
issues that legal historians have frequently addressed.

Recognizing the nature of the gulf between the two
makes it easier to understand the analogous change that
transformed American legal thought after Green and
Holmes. In particular, it helps clarify the nature and
First, and most generally, it confirms a familiar if reality of the “legal science” that so many nineteenthnonetheless fundamental lesson. Although addressing century legal writers proclaimed and practiced. Modern
a different historical period and different substantive islegal scholars often have been reluctant to credit their
sues, it shows exactly what Jack Rakove showed in his
forebears with being “legal scientists,” but Menand helps
excellent book, Original Meanings[2]: that historical phe- us understand why those earlier writers so perceived
nomena -whether ideas and events, or legal enactments themselves, how later generations came to understand
and opinions - are deeply and inextricably embedded in the term “science” in such a new, radically different way,
a complex, profoundly human context. The relationship and why, consequently, those later generations had difbetween human behavior and formal norms and decificulty understanding the nature of nineteenth-century
sions, Menand suggests, is complex, varied, individual,
“legal science.”[3]
and only imperfectly knowable. Thus, any theory that
posits an objective, knowable, and specifically directive
Finally, The Metaphysical Club suggests the “thick,”
“original intent” as a general basis for interpreting the intertwined roots of the cultural commitments to indiConstitution must ultimately be unsatisfying and nuga- vidualism, the “free market,” and private contract that
tory. It must either rely for purposes of expedience on marked mid- and late-nineteenth-century America. By
assumptions that are simplified, tractable, and to some showing that human behavior in the aggregate conextent arbitrary, or it must rest content with results that formed to certain patterns, Darwinism and statistical theare vague, non-determinative, and ultimately inadequate ory seemed to coincide in showing “that things regulated
to the theory’s prescriptive claims.
themselves” (p. 194). That conclusion, in turn, “was taken
to confer a kind of cosmic seal of approval on the political
Menand also demonstrates, however, as Rakove did, doctrines of individualism and laissez-faire” (id.). Racist
that the proper lesson to be drawn from a recognition assumptions cemented the consensus. Huxley and othof historical complexity is double-edged. If historical
ers helped formulate “a theology for the postslavery era”
inquiry can seldom provide answers to specific, fairly
(p. 195) by arguing that natural selection showed that the
contested constitutional questions, it can nevertheless “white man” was superior to the black and that he could
yield its own rich, salient harvest. When thoroughly re- “wash his hands” (id.) of any responsibility for racial insearched and deeply informed, when sensitive and ex- equalities. Thus, a powerful matrix of ideas, attitudes, inacting, and when fair and honest, it can yield the kind terests, and existing “human arrangements” generated a
of profound insights and deep understanding that underdeep, widespread belief in a particular, culturally-defined
write sound practical judgment and, on occasion, even
concept of individual freedom: “Nineteenth-century libinspire wisdom about the conduct of human affairs.
erals believed that the market operated like nature beSecond, Menand highlights a fundamental element in cause they had already decided that nature operated like
the intellectual transformation that occurred during the a market” (id.).
nineteenth century: a radical reconception and redefiniFor legal and constitutional historians, the point
tion of “science” itself. Commenting on Gray’s triumph seems clear. “Classical legal thought,” “laissez-faire conover Agassiz in their debate about Darwinism, for examstitutionalism,” and the general jurisprudence of the
ple, Menand stresses the nature of the divide that sepSupreme Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
arated them: “Gray understood something that Agassiz centuries did not flow directly from the language of the
did not, which was that there were new rules for scientific Constitution, the original intent of its framers, or the catargument” (p. 126). Gray “was thinking in terms of re- egories and methods of the common law.[4] Rather, those
lations and probabilities,” while Agassiz “was still think- legal phenomena were complex cultural products. They
ing in terms of types and ideas.” It was Gray’s new unwere the results of many of the same forces that Menand
derstanding, subsequently developed by Peirce and then
identifies, as well as many others beyond the scope of his
transferred into legal theory by Green and Holmes, that work, including the politics of judicial appointment, the
swept the field in the twentieth century, while Agassiz’s emergence of an ethnically diverse industrial work force,
understanding came to seem outmoded, rationalistic, and the rise and triumph of large-scale corporate capitalism,
even obscurantist (pp. 222-226).
and the changing nature, structure, and social composi5
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tion of the legal profession itself.

deeply grateful to Prof. Howard Erlanger, the book review editor of Law and Social Inquiry, and Prof. Victoria Saker Woeste, co-editor of Law and Social Inquiry, for
their willingness to publish the longer review from which
this review is drawn.

Those intertwined jurisprudential phenomena, furthermore, were the result of conscious and individual human purposes as well as cultural presumptions. Menand
offers as evidence of his claim about the influence of
classical economic theory an opinion of William Howard
Taft, then a federal circuit judge, sentencing one of the
leaders of the Pullman strike to a six-month prison term
for contempt.[5] Although the opinion shows the influence of classical economic theory, it also suggests Taft’s
individual values and biases. Other opinions that he
wrote establish that Taft was an able legal craftsman who
could and did purposefully manipulate legal concepts to
achieve the specific social results he desired.[6] That important if unsurprising conclusion is, of course, consistent with two of Menand’s basic pragmatic premises: that
individuals act to serve purposes, and that each individual has a unique life experience and, consequently, may
think, decide, and take action in his or her own distinct
and even singular way.

[2.] Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and
Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1996).
[3.] Whereas Menand suggests the ways that Holmes,
James, Peirce, and Dewey were “modernists” who shaped
the twentieth-century world, he also stresses the gulf
that separates them from their early twenty-first century descendants. “[I]t is worth trying to see how almost
unimaginably strange they and their world were, too” (p.
442). For an excellent discussion of nineteenth-century
“legal science,” see William P. LaPiana, Logic & Experience: The Origin of Modern American Legal Education
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). For a more
general discussion of American legal thought from the
late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century, see
Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

The Metaphysical Club thus highlights one of the fundamental problems in contemporary American jurisprudence: the meaning, nature, and reality of “the rule of
law.” An acute challenge to legal and constitutional theory, the problem of “the rule of law” now presents equally
a challenge to contemporary American politics and institutions. The broadest significance of Bush v. Gore,[7]
after all, is that the Supreme Court of the United States
had a breathtaking opportunity to demonstrate that “the
rule of law” existed and worked; that legal principles and
practices did, in fact, limit and channel judicial judgment;
that law and politics were, indeed, distinct and contrasting arenas. And yet, when taken to the mountaintop
and shown the riches and glories of the presidency of
the United States, it succumbed. Thus, Menand’s basic
premises - and the premises of pragmatism - seem once
again both incisive and well-founded. We would, indeed,
seem to be living in the world that the classical age of
pragmatism helped create and shape.

[4.] See generally William M. Wiecek, The Lost
World of Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology
in America, 1886-1937 (New York, 1998). But see Felice Batlan, “Review of William M. Wiecek, The Lost
World of Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in
America 1886-1937,” H-Law, H-Net Reviews, January,
2000. URL: http://www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/
showrev.cgi?~path=13193948754428.
[5.] Thomas v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific
Railway Co. v. Phelan, 62 F. 803 (C.C. S.D. Ohio 1894).
[6.] See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Litigation and Inequality: Federal Diversity Jurisdiction in Industrial America,
1870-1958 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992),
109-12. See generally Robert Post, “Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era,”
Boston University Law Review 78 (1998): 1489.

ENDNOTES

[7.] 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

[1.] The author is Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor of Law at New York Law School. He wishes to
thank William P. LaPiana, Ann F. Thomas, and R. B. Bernstein for helpful comments on an early draft. This review,
commissioned by H-LAW, is a heavily condensed extract
from a much longer review growing out of the original
review assignment; that version will appear in Law and
Social Inquiry later in 2002. H-LAW and the author are
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